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Summary
Amid growing awareness that China’s Maritime Militia acts as a Third Sea Force which has been
involved in international sea incidents, it is necessary for decision-makers who may face such
contingencies to understand the Maritime Militia’s role in China’s armed forces. Chinese-language
open sources reveal a tremendous amount about Maritime Militia activities, both in coordination with
and independent of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Using well-documented evidence from the
authors’ extensive open source research, this report seeks to clarify the Maritime Militia’s exact
identity, organization, and connection to the PLA as a reserve force that plays a parallel and
supporting role to the PLA. Despite being a separate component of China’s People’s Armed Forces
(PAF), the militia are organized and commanded directly by the PLA’s local military commands.
The militia’s status as a separate non-PLA force whose units act as “helpers of the PLA” (解放军的
助手)2 is further reflected in China’s practice of carrying out “joint military, law enforcement, and
civilian [Navy-Maritime Law Enforcement-Maritime Militia] defense” (军警民联防). To more
accurately capture the identity of the Maritime Militia, the authors propose referring to these irregular
forces as the “People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia” (PAFMM).
Like a tetherball, the PAFMM may be sent in many different directions when contacted by different
players in the Chinese security space, but is often directed by the PLA and always remains tied to the
PLA.

China Maritime Report No. 1

1

CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE
CENTER FOR NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
686 CUSHING ROAD (3C)
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND 02841

Key points:
1. Leading elements of China’s Maritime Militia have already played frontline roles in manifold
Chinese incidents and skirmishes with foreign mariners throughout the South China Sea.
2. The Militia is a key component of China’s Armed Forces and a part of what it calls the “People’s
Armed Forces System” (人武系统).3
3. China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is therefore the most accurate name
for this Third Sea Force of China.
4. Directed participation by PAFMM forces in international sea incidents or provocations occurs
under the PLA chain of command, and sometimes also under the temporary command of the Chinese
Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE).
5. The PAFMM is thus a state-organized, -developed, and -controlled force operating under a direct
military chain of command to conduct Chinese state-sponsored activities.

Command and Control
China boasts the world’s largest fishing fleet. A portion of its thousands of fishing vessels, and the
thousands of people who work on them and in related industries, are registered in the Maritime
Militia.4 China’s PAFMM is an armed mass organization primarily comprising mariners working in
the civilian economy who are trained and can be mobilized to defend and advance China’s maritime
territorial claims, protect “maritime rights and interests,” and support the PLA Navy (PLAN) in
wartime.
China’s People’s Armed Forces include the PLA, People’s Armed Police (PAP), and the militia, of
which the PAF Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is a subset. As militia, members of the PAFMM typically
retain their regular civilian employment while fulfilling their scheduled training and providing their
service on demand for multifarious state-sponsored activities. To fully understand the PAFMM, it is
critical to assess the institutional relationship between the PLA and the militia broadly.
Militia building typically involves a separate system in the armed forces, termed the “militia system”
(民兵制度). The most recent official public description, in China’s 2013 Defense White Paper, states
that they serve “as an assistant and backup force of the PLA.” While the militia is classified as a
reserve force (后备力量), it should not be confused with the actual reserves of the PLA services (预
备役部队). China builds the militia and the PLA reserves simultaneously as two separate
components of its reserve force system.5 Authoritative Chinese writings typically refer to the militia
as “China militia” (中国民兵), essentially a reserve force that plays a parallel and supporting role to
the PLA. This confers three responsibilities: first, to support the PLA in defending China from
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external threats, and second, to assist China’s domestic security forces to ensure social stability and
to engage in disaster relief.
The militia has a military organizational structure and, despite being a separate component of China’s
armed forces, is organized and commanded directly by the PLA’s local military commands. 6 Its
forces are subject to the “dual-responsibility system” (双重领导) at the core of civil-military
leadership over local forces. This system is implemented through multiple institutionalized
mechanisms whereby local military and civilian leaders serve in posts on each other’s Party
Committees that oversee militia work. Civilian leadership involvement in local military commands’
work helps ensure ‘Party control of the gun’ and creates useful synergies by leveraging local civilian
resources.7
Fundamentally, militia units are local forces levied by provincial governments to support national
defense efforts. This is reflected in the interactions between local civilian and military leaders.
National militia work policies are prescribed for the provinces by the Central Military Commission’s
National Defense Mobilization Department, currently headed by PLA Generals. The PLA Provincial
Military Districts (MD) send their militia force requirements to the provincial government/Party
apparatuses, which then plan and fund construction of the militia in their social and economic plans. 8
The local PLA commands (MDs, Military Subdistricts, and People’s Armed Forces
Departments/PAFDs) then organize, train, and command the militia units. When required, other
maritime-related government departments also help local military and government authorities to
construct the PAFMM. For example, local branches of MLE agencies such as the Maritime Safety
Administration and the China Coast Guard (CCG) provide safety or technical training pertinent to
their departmental specialties.9 Both central and provincial governments provide funding for the
militia.10 Local governments cover lost wages or damages incurred by militia personnel in training or
missions. Since they help foot the bill for militia construction, local governments may call on the
units if needed. The militia thus also provide a ready source of manpower for local governments in
times of emergencies, such as natural disasters, law enforcement, and search and rescue efforts. This
division of responsibilities requires civilian and military leaders to cooperate in militia building.
At the bottom tiers of the PLA local commands are the PAFDs, which link the PAFMM directly to
the PLA chain of command. They are divided into county-level and grassroots-level PAFDs.11 The
county-level PAFDs, through which PAFMM communications and directives—such as mobilization
and mission orders—must typically pass, are manned by active duty PLA personnel. Below them, the
grassroots PAFDs are manned by civilian cadres whose salaries are paid by local governments and
sometimes work on a part-time basis. These grassroots PAFDs are the closest interface through
which militia interact with the PLA command on a regular basis, as their direct managers for
recruitment, planning, organization, training, and policy execution.
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The militia’s status as a separate non-PLA armed force is further reflected in China’s practice of
conducting “joint military, law enforcement, and civilian defense” (军警民联防). At sea, this takes
the form of “joint PLAN, MLE, and Maritime Militia [PAFMM] defense.”12 Managing this joint
defense system is a key responsibility of PLA commands located in border and coastal regions, such
as the Sansha Garrison on Woody Island in the Paracels. These efforts are meant to integrate and
coordinate local forces, such as the PAFMM and the PAP, vis-à-vis the PLA services’ joint
warfighting operations. These dedicated efforts to incorporate local forces into broader joint
operations seek to enable the PAFMM to operate effectively in such close coordination with the PLA
services. Official Chinese sources indicate that leading PAFMM units are receiving military training
directly from uniformed PLAN personnel while wearing their own militia uniforms.13 Their vessels
conduct exercises with PLAN and CCG vessels. To incentivize such risky state service, localities
provide PAFMM personnel with a range of periodically-adjusted compensation and remuneration,
including substantial pensions, social benefits, and subsidies.
Militia units established to specifically support PLA services, called “Service Support Detachments”
(军兵种民兵分队), have also received greater emphasis over the past decade.14 “Specialized Naval
Militia Detachments” (海军民兵专业分队), created jointly by Military Subdistricts and the PLAN,
train to provide specified support for naval combat operations. While the types of units vary
significantly, the specialized naval militia detachments appear to draw upon technical professionals
and former PLAN sailors for unit personnel, and to requisition fishing vessels for missions.15 Unlike
other PAFMM units that also carry out peacetime missions in support of China’s maritime claims,
this subset of PAFMM enjoys a particularly close relationship with the PLAN and likely focuses
heavily on combat scenarios.
Chinese leaders clearly see value in the PAFMM’s blurred status.16 Among the chief motivations for
building the militia is that it is not technically a direct subcomponent of the PLA. This rationale was
also present during the establishment of the PAP in 1982 as an internal security force to relieve the
PLA of the controversial task of suppressing domestic unrest. Such ambiguity affords the PAFMM
great leeway in supporting China’s national interests and maritime claims.17 It offers freedom to act
in ways that would otherwise tarnish the PLA’s professional image and heighten escalation risks. 18
For example, an article run on the PLAN’s website described the advantages civilian identities afford
PAFMM forces in terms of the “Three Warfares.” According to the author, PAFMM forces can
“utilize their identities as civilians to create concern for maritime rights protection, spread maritime
rights protection thought, display the determination and confidence of the nation’s people in
protecting maritime rights and interests, makes gains in public opinion space, and occupy our rightful
moral high ground.” The author also states that PAFMM personnel enjoy civilian liberties denied to
active duty troops in the expression of policy, allowing them to guide public opinion in maritime
affairs.19 Having a third sea force that can keep a low profile and engage in deception while
remaining subject to PLA command and control thus appears to be an essential motivation for
China’s retention of a body that might appear crude and unprofessional in some respects.
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The PAFMM contributes to China’s overall national defense mobilization work and is subject to the
dual-leadership of local civilian and military organs. Thus, it is a unique component of China’s
armed forces that is both separate from, and bound to, the PLA.
See Figure 1 (below) for a graphic depiction of PAFMM organization.

China Maritime Report No. 1

5

CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE
CENTER FOR NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
686 CUSHING ROAD (3C)
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND 02841

Figure 1:
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Notes for Figure 1 (above):
1

Command of the PAFMM depends on the conditions prompting its mobilization in the first place,
both in peace and in war. Generally, the MD chain of command exercises command over the
PAFMM until operational command is delegated temporarily to the PLAN or CCG.20 The PAFMM
serves the Navy in both peacetime and wartime. MLE forces can also call on PAFMM forces for
their own missions, but would likely have to provide compensation for the resources, i.e., fuel and
labor, expended in such operations.21 In their non-activated regular capacity as civilians conducting
economic activities such as fishing, PAFMM members also maintain subordinate relationships with
administrative entities such as the CCG and the PAP Border Defense Force. In all cases, the MD
military and civilian leadership would be involved, either directly or at very least in a supervisory
role.
2

National Defense Mobilization Committees (国防动员委员会) are consulting and coordinating
bodies that assemble each level of civilian and military leadership under a single decision-making
organ. Each level of NDMC works to ensure that national resources can be swiftly incorporated into
national emergency or war efforts. Following recent PLA organizational reforms, it remains unclear
whether there is still a NDMC-level entity between MDs and the State/CMC level, heretofore known
as the “Military Region NDMC.” Transforming the former Military Regions into Theater Commands
was meant to focus theater level commands’ efforts on joint warfighting rather than on the
administrative functions of preparation for mobilization. The lack of Chinese reporting makes
verification of this issue particularly difficult. Not reflected in the above organization chart, but also
relevant to PAFMM building, are the Border and Coastal Defense Committees (边海防委员会)
established in coastal provinces. As with the NDMCs, there is a State Border and Coastal Defense
Committee under the unified leadership of the CMC and State Council, as well as Border and Coastal
Defense Committees established at each corresponding level of governments and military commands
in the provinces. These committees are also consulting and coordinating bodies for implementing
defense of China’s land borders and claimed territorial waters, coordinating military and civilian
forces under a single decision-making body. It also remains unknown if there will be a Border and
Coastal Defense Committee at the former Military Region level, i.e., in the new Theater Commands.
3

Following the latest reforms, former Military Regions have been relieved of their responsibility for
the construction of reserve forces in the provinces. MDs are now under the management of the CMC
National Defense Mobilization Department. In times of emergency or war, Theater Commands
would likely assume a commanding role for militia forces operating within their areas of geographic
responsibility.
4

The depiction of three PAFMM units does not represent any specific order of battle or
organizational structure, but rather illustrates that multiple Maritime Militia units may exist under an
individual PAFD.
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Nature of PLA Control in Specific Incidents
While not all PAFMM activities at sea are directly controlled by the PLA in real time, the ones of
greatest concern to the United States and its allies and security partners are PLA-affiliated. A PLAmandated approval process for mobilizing the PAFMM is always involved in events that include its
use. Due to the dual-responsibility system, local governments are often involved in providing
leadership over PAFMM forces when they are mobilized. Depending on the type of missions
assigned, local governments and government agencies will both assume relevant roles to facilitate the
missions of the PAFMM, thereby ensuring “unified leadership” (统一领导) between the local
military and government organs.
Critically, deliberate participation by PAFMM forces in international sea incidents occurs directly
under the PLA chain of command, at least in a supervisory capacity. Moreover, some leading
elements of the PAFMM appear to be increasingly professionalized and militarized; the most
advanced among them may draw a generous salary with no fishing or other civil economic
employment whatsoever.22 This trend would certainly make management and training of the
PAFMM easier for PLA authorities. Increasingly capable PAFMM forces may also be bolstered by
the continued downsizing of the PLA Army as veterans comprise priority recruitment by MDs.
Although the following examples are from the South China Sea, abundant evidence indicates that
similar control structures are present in the MDs in coastal provinces bordering the East China Sea
and the Yellow Sea.
Activities are also initiated by non-PLA organs, albeit with PLA approval, in a general supervisory
role attentive to the condition of units and their vessels. These include basic recurrent peacetime
tasks such as fishing, typhoon response and other disaster relief organized by local governments,
search and rescue missions to assist the CCG, presence missions in disputed waters, and the
expulsion of foreign fishermen from Chinese-claimed waters. Examples of non-recurrent
assignments not known to involve PLA initiation include the following. In March 2009 Sanya’s
Maritime Militia participated in the harassment of the USNS Impeccable. In March 2014, it
participated in the search for missing Malaysian Airlines Flight 370, likely within the confines of the
South China Sea. In April 2013 Sanya’s Maritime Militia protected China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC)’s surveying operations south of Triton Island.
The harassment of the USNS Impeccable is a fitting example. Fisheries Law Enforcement (FLE)
under the direction of FLE South China Sea Bureau Director Wu Zhuang commanded the fishing
vessels that impeded the U.S. survey vessel’s operations.23 Having established a PAFMM unit in
2009,24 the Sanya Fugang Fisheries Company grassroots PAFD would thus have requested mission
approval from its superiors in the district or municipal PAFDs in Sanya City, notifying their PLA
superiors at a minimum. The degree to which the PLA was involved in harassment of the USNS
Impeccable is still unclear; at least one PLAN vessel was on the scene. However, the fact that the
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Sanya fishing vessels involved were in the PAFMM would necessitate PLA awareness of FLE
intentions regarding the incident.
PAFMM activities documented to have been initiated and guided by PLA organs include direct
participation in the following international sea incidents pre-planned by China: the 1974 seizure of
the Western Paracels from Vietnam, reconnaissance and sovereignty patrols during the February
2014 blockade of Second Thomas Shoal, and the 2014 repulsion of Vietnamese vessels from
disputed waters surrounding the CNOOC HYSY-981 oil rig.
The 2012 Scarborough Shoal Standoff shows how the PLA can mobilize militia forces already at sea.
Available sources do not reveal a direct PLA connection to the initial PAFMM-related encounters
that sparked the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal Standoff. However, reports on members of the
PAFMM unit present and their actions at Scarborough Shoal suggest PLA involvement in subsequent
command and control of PAFMM operations to help seize the feature from the Philippines.
When Philippine naval forces arrived at Scarborough Shoal on 10 April 2012, Chinese militiamen
from the Port of Tanmen in Hainan Province provided their first reports to a Border Defense Force
Control Station located in their home port, which in turn alerted a civilian law enforcement agency
(China Marine Surveillance, now part of the CCG) to come to their aid. PAFMM-produced reporting
on events at sea is shared among the local military commands, PLAN, and CCG; the Tanmen
Maritime Militia alone is credited with providing 510 pieces of “valuable intelligence” in recent
years.25 Among the six Tanmen fishing vessels initially inside Scarborough Shoal’s lagoon, two were
commanded by known Tanmen Maritime Militia squad leaders Chen Zebo and Xu Detan. The owner
of fishing vessel Qionghai 02096 and likely a militia member, Yu Ning, transmitted several messages
that alerted the PAP Border Defense Control Station of the unfolding situation and the identity of the
approaching Philippine naval vessel BRP Gregorio del Pilar. The station’s attendant then rapidly
issued a quick brief that was probably shared with PLAN and MLE forces.26 While the Tanmen
Militia contingent was escorted away after the initial standoff by MLE vessels, their subsequent
mobilization and return to the vicinity of the shoal under the company’s deputy commander, who
then led the unit from outside the shoal, suggests PLA approval of such mobilization.
The PLA communicates with PAFMM vessels at sea by using a communications suite required by
the MD Command to be present aboard all militia vessels. Moreover, to join the PAFMM, a Chinese
fishing vessel or enterprise must meet certain capability and reliability requirements before gaining
membership; many are thus ineligible. Vessels are inspected to ensure they have the onboard
equipment27 to stay connected to the PAFD and can respond wherever they are located. This is
central to the ISR reporting of the PAFMM, a persistent function that occurs regularly and
independently outside of missions and training.28 While exact reporting protocol varies, it appears
that PAFMM reporting follows the same channels that their mobilization orders originate from, the
MD Command system and their PAFDs, which subsequently is shared with other agencies. During
PAFMM personnel training, PAFDs provide specialized training to “information personnel” in target
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identification and reporting protocol. MLE forces are also involved in these information-sharing
channels, but direct PAFMM to MLE vessel reporting requirements remain unclear or perhaps
temporary or conditional.29 Nonetheless, PAFMM forces make regular contributions to China’s
maritime domain awareness, regardless of mobilization status.
Key Actors: The Leading Units
The PAFMM organizational structure resembles an enormous pyramid with a broad base. The vast
majority of the thousands of Maritime Militia personnel and vessels handle relatively mundane tasks,
such as supporting basic port security, in undisputed shoreline areas of no direct concern to foreign
nations or navies.30 An elite subset is entrusted with operating far from Mainland China’s coastline
and monitoring, approaching, and engaging with other foreign sea actors as necessary, including in
international sea incidents. This is evident in both articles authored by PLA leaders and actual unit
construction.31
These advanced units can be defined specifically because they are distinctive and few. They are the
frontline irregular forces that the United States and its allies and partners will most likely encounter
in the Near Seas (Yellow, East China, and South China Seas). With respect to the South China Sea,
most known leading units are based in Hainan Province, which according to Chinese policy
statements administers the vast majority of the South China Sea. Four major PAFMM units dominate
Hainan’s Maritime Militia operations in the South China Sea. The Danzhou Militia, still active and
developing today, is the successor to the militia company that played an important role in the 1974
Battle of the Paracel Islands wherein China wrested the Western Paracels from Vietnam. The
Tanmen Militia, established in 1985, supported early first-generation-structure construction on such
Chinese-occupied Spratly features as Mischief Reef in the 1990s and more recently played a key role
in China’s 2012 takeover of Scarborough Shoal. President Xi Jinping visited the Tanmen Militia in
April 2013. Sanya City’s Maritime Militia had a frontline role in disrupting USNS Impeccable’s
operations in March 2009. Maritime Militia units from across Hainan Province, including key units
from Sanya and Tanmen, participated in the two-month-long incident over an oil rig placed inside
Vietnam’s claimed EEZ in 2014.32 The latest leading unit is the Sansha City Maritime Militia
headquartered on the Paracels’ Woody Island, a prefectural-level city responsible for administering
China’s South China Sea claims, including in the Paracels, Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough
Shoal, and the Spratlys.
In Sansha, China is generating a new model for PAFMM development. The militia in the Sansha
City Fisheries Development Company was established to be a professional paramilitary force first
and foremost, with fishing a secondary mission at best. Sansha Maritime Militia members have been
photographed loading crates labeled “light weapons” onto one of their several dozen newly delivered
large vessels, all of which boast mast-mounted water cannons, collision-absorbing rails, and
reinforced hulls—highly useful features for aggressive spraying and ramming. The largest Sansha
Maritime Militia vessels are 59 meters long with 9 meters beam, and likely displace approximately
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750 tons. Their smaller counterparts are likely closer to 600 tons.33 All have considerable
displacement and are longer than the Parola-class patrol vessels Japan is constructing for the
Philippines.34 Some of these new ships reportedly have a “weapons and equipment room” and an
“ammunition store.”35
Sansha is taking the blue hull role in China’s three-tier Navy-MLE-Maritime Militia “joint defense”
to a new level of frontline capability, centered on a $6 million command center. This force also
operates “informatized” outposts on at least two Paracel Islands that monitor proximal seas. PLA
leaders have indicated that these initial outposts will be replicated in the Spratlys, and have begun
construction on three other features in the Paracels. Already, the Sansha Garrison has established a
PAFD on Fiery Cross Reef and a PAFMM element on Mischief Reef, foreshadowing a future
permanent PAFMM presence in the Spratlys.
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APPENDIX 1: PHOTOS

Ta Kung Pao, 14 July 2016: One of Sansha City’s newly-built PAFMM fishing vessels,
“Qiongsanshayu 00111” (琼三沙渔), participates in the “2016 Sansha Maritime Emergency
Response Exercise” hosted by the Hainan Maritime Safety Administration. Shown in this photo
conducting firefighting and rescue operations, this is one example of the new elite PAFMM forces’
vessels under construction for Sansha City.

China Military Online, 24 September 2016: (Guangdong Province) Zhanjiang Maritime Militia come
alongside a PLAN vessel for training. The appearance of these fishing vessels is typical of regular
PRC fishing vessels.

China Maritime Report No. 1

12

CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE
CENTER FOR NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
686 CUSHING ROAD (3C)
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND 02841

China Military Online, 24 September 2016: (Guangdong Province) Zhanjiang Maritime Militia
shown conducting Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) resupply training with the PLAN wearing
clearly marked green uniforms. Collar insignia reads “GDMB” (“Guangdong Minbing”). Most
militia uniforms only feature the letters “MB” on collar insignia without additional geographic
designator abbreviations.
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Hainan Daily, 5 January 2015: (Hainan Province) Tanmen Maritime Militia are assembled wearing a
different style of uniform. The Tanmen Maritime Militia have also appeared wearing the army-style
green camouflage uniforms shown in the previous photo of the Zhanjiang Maritime Militia.

China Military Online, 23 July 2016: A PLAN South Sea Fleet base, most likely the Yulin Navy
Base given its mobilization of Sanya City’s Maritime Militia in this instance, held a joint defense
exercise including PLAN ships, submarines, aircraft, shore-based guided missiles, special forces, and
public security forces; as well as both land-based militia and the Maritime Militia. This photo shows
a Maritime Militia unit from Sanya City’s Tianya district participating in the exercise, wearing blue
uniforms clearly indicating their identity as “Tianya Militia” (天涯民兵) on the shoulder patch.
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The November 2016 issue of China’s Militia covering the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region’s
border and coastal defense work featured this image of non-uniformed PAFMM personnel during
inspection. The article also described one of the militia’s requisite characteristics as: “putting on
military uniforms [they] qualify as soldiers, taking off the uniforms they qualify as citizens” (穿上军
装做合格战士, 脱下军装做合格公民).36
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NOTES:
1

The views expressed here are the authors’ alone. They do not represent the estimates or policies of the U.S. Navy
or any other organization of the U.S. government. A complete compilation of the authors’ analysis, together with
related sources and data, is available at: http://www.andrewerickson.com/2017/03/china-open-source-exampleshipyard-details-sansha-maritime-militia-vessel-with-weapons-and-equipment-room-and-ammunition-store/.
2
“中国武装力量的多样化运用” [The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces], Information Office of
the State Council, People’s Republic of China, 2013, http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/201304/16/content_4442839.htm.
3
China’s “People’s Armed Forces System” is comprised of three bodies of personnel: the civilian People’s Armed
Forces Cadres that man the grassroots PAFDs, the staff of grassroots PAFDs—usually veterans, and the militia.
4
While exact numbers are difficult to calculate from open sources, a rough estimate within an order of magnitude
can be established by sifting through reports on PAFMM units in the provinces. The scale and effective strength of a
province’s PAFMM force are directly determined by its local conditions, such as the dynamism of its marine
economy. The authors’ research on Hainan Province has identified 31 PAFMM units, all of which would be
considered fendui (分队) or tactical-level-unit organizations (battalion, company, platoon, squad). While most
counties establish at least one company-sized PAFMM unit, their size and capabilities vary tremendously. For
example, some units can conduct missions in the Spratlys with their large-tonnage seagoing vessels while others stay
in close to shore with their smaller, less capable vessels. Some specialized support units may not even possess
vessels organic to their unit and must requisition them when training or conducting missions. In addition to the 31
units the authors have identified, there are also many other smaller militia elements on Hainan Island and stationed
at outposts and PRC-occupied features in the South China Sea. One can notionally estimate the total number of
personnel and vessels in Hainan’s PAFMM force by assuming that the 31 units are each the rough median size of a
PAFMM company (approximately 120 personnel and 10 fishing vessels). This would yield a hypothetical total of
3,720 personnel and 310 vessels.
5
“国防后备力量” [National Defense Reserve Force], Jinhu County People’s Government Double-Support Office,
20 October 2016, http://www.jinhu.gov.cn/art/2016/10/20/art_96_19469.html.
6
Local military commands here refer to the levels of organization set up by the PLA in province-level
administrative areas, forming what China terms “local military and government” (地方军地). Each military region (
军区), recently reformed from 7 Military Regions into 5 Theater Commands (战区), contains several provinces and
hence several Provincial Military Districts (省军区). The geographic area of responsibility by each Provincial
Military District coincides with the borders of the provincial administrative area. As each province is divided into
municipalities, each Provincial Military District is divided into multiple Military Subdistricts (军分区); within each
Military Subdistrict are numerous county-level and grassroots People’s Armed Forces Departments. The county
level PAFDs are staffed by active-duty personnel while the grassroots PAFDs are non-active duty organizations
staffed by “full-time People’s Armed Forces cadres” (专职人民武装干部). The Provincial Military Districts
oversee local PLA units and the reserves (both PLA reserves and PAF militia), including the militia work conducted
by their subordinate Military Subdistricts and PAFDs within its area of responsibility. Each corresponding level of
government in the provinces also shares responsibility for coordinating with their military counterparts, the
equivalent level of local military command, to build and support the militia. This civilian-military division of
responsibilities mitigates the costs and burdens of militia building on any single department.
7
Like the PLA, militia units have Party organizations to implement the PLA’s political work. For example, militia
companies have a Party branch with a political instructor. Platoons and squads also form Party Small Groups. Party
members often become leading cadres in militia units. Party representation ensures Party control of the gun at the
micro-levels of militia organization.
8
Local governments can also make use of their administrative authorities to ensure smooth execution of PAFMM
missions and training, as well as coordination among different bureaucracies (Maritime Safety Administration,
CCG, etc.) when drafting emergency response plans that may entail mobilization of the militia. Local military
commands also work with civilian governments to legislate rules and regulations for the use of PAFMM forces. This
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dual-responsibility system between local military and government authorities enables deeper civil-military
integration and resource sharing in militia construction.
9
张践 [Zhang Jian], “围绕 ‘六化’ 抓建 推动海上民兵转型” [Advance the Transformation of Maritime Militia
Centered on ‘Six Changes’], National Defense 10 (2015),
http://kns55.en.eastview.com/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?recid=&FileName=GUOF201510009&DbName=CJFD2015&
DbCode=CJFD; “钦州军分区着力提升实战能力 – 联训联演建强海上民兵” [The Qinzhou Military Subdistrict
Strives to Enhance Combat Capability – Joint Exercises Strengthen the Maritime Militia], China Defense News, 15
July 2015, http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2015-07/15/content_4601890.htm.
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To build the militia, the PLA receives direct allocations from central and provincial governments, and is required
to submit budgets and reports for approval by government authorities. The PLA manages those funds internally
through its chain of logistics departments. In addition, local governments compensate militia personnel directly for
wages lost while participating in training. PAFMM costs introduce greater complexity in funding and compensation
since elements of the force assist and receive support from multiple bureaucracies, such as MLE forces. Some
sources suggest that whoever uses PAFMM units must provide a degree of support for those operations (谁用兵谁
保障), implying that CCG may have to provide funding and material support to PAFMM units that it uses. As
reflected in the dual-responsibility system of military and civilian leaders over the militia, military and civilian
cooperation is required to fund the militia.
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Most county PAFDs are regimental grade organizations within the PLA grade structure, while PAFDs established
in sub-provincial cities and their districts are deputy divisional grade organizations.
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interspersed with the letters “MB,” an abbreviation of the Chinese word for militia, “minbing.” Identification of
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